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 FEDERAL COURTS’ SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY IN 
FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES: 
THE WARREN COURT REVOLUTION THAT MIGHT 
HAVE BEEN 
Bruce A. Green* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Warren Court is said to have launched a criminal procedure 
“revolution” with its decision in Mapp v. Ohio,1 extending the Fourth 
Amendment’s exclusionary rule to state court proceedings.2 Thereafter, 
the Warren Court continued to interpret the Bill of Rights provisions 
expansively to protect individual rights and promote fair process in both 
state and federal criminal cases. Considerable writing has been devoted 
to the Warren Court’s constitutional criminal procedure decisions both 
individually and collectively. Scholars debate both the motivation 
behind these decisions3 and the significance of their impact, given how 
inhospitable many of the later Court’s decisions have been toward 
criminal defendants’ rights and Warren Court precedent.4 
This Article examines the significance of a non-constitutional 
criminal procedure decision from the Warren Court’s pre-revolutionary 
 
 *  © 2020, Stein Chair and Director of the Stein Center for Law and Ethics at Fordham Law 
School. For many helpful comments on an earlier draft, my thanks to participants in the August 
2018 SEALS discussion group and the April 2019 Stetson Law Review symposium on “Conversations 
on the Warren Court’s Impact on Criminal Justice—After 50 Years.” 
 1. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 2. See Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal Justice: A Quarter-Century Retrospective, 
31 TULSA L. REV. 1, 1–2 & n.3 (1995); Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Constitution and the Police: Individual 
Rights and Law Enforcement, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 11, 12 (1988). 
 3. See, e.g., Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren 
Court’s Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 1364 (2004) (challenging 
“whether the Warren Court’s criminal procedure decisions were truly the bastion of 
countermajoritarian decision making they have been made out to be”); Eric J. Miller, The Warren 
Court’s Regulatory Revolution in Criminal Procedure, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2010) (challenging the 
“standard story” that the Court was “motivated by an emphasis on political, social, and economic 
equality for racial minorities” until it became “[f]rightened . . . by the popular backlash against high 
crime rates”). 
 4. See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two 
Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466 (1996) (discussing debate). 
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period. It looks back at Offutt v. United States,5 a relatively obscure case 
decided by the Warren Court in 1954, seven years before Mapp. 
Offutt reviewed a criminal defense lawyer’s criminal conviction. 
The federal district judge presiding over a criminal trial was offended by 
Offutt’s defense tactics and, at the close of the trial, punished Offutt 
summarily for contempt of court.6 In overturning Offutt’s conviction 
because of the district judge’s lack of impartiality, the Court invoked 
“th[e] Court’s ‘supervisory authority over the administration of criminal 
justice in the federal courts,’”7 not constitutional due process, on which 
the Court relied two decades later when it set aside a contempt 
conviction imposed by a state trial judge in similar circumstances.8 In 
subsequent decisions into the early 1960s, the Court continued to 
express its conception of fair process by invoking its supervisory 
authority in federal criminal cases. However, beginning with Mapp, the 
Court set its sights on state criminal process, issuing the expansive 
constitutional rulings for which the Warren Court is better remembered. 
This Article traces the Supreme Court’s expansion and contraction 
of supervisory authority in federal criminal cases. It briefly describes the 
Court’s “supervisory authority” decisions leading up to Offutt in Part II, 
and discusses Offutt in Part III. Then the Article turns to Offutt’s 
aftermath. Part IV describes the initial significance of supervisory 
authority following Offutt, while Part V discusses the declining role of 
supervisory authority once the Warren Court turned its attention to the 
Bill of Rights provisions, and Part VI describes the erosion of supervisory 
authority by later Courts. The Article concludes in Part VII by asking 
whether supervisory authority might have sustained a more important 
role in federal criminal procedure if it had been more firmly entrenched 
during the Warren Court era. 
II. SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY PRIOR TO OFFUTT 
The Supreme Court’s 1943 decision in McNabb v. United States9 is 
said to mark the Court’s earliest invocation of “supervisory authority” 
over the administration of criminal justice.10 In McNabb, the Court held 
 
 5. 348 U.S. 11 (1954). 
 6. Id. at 12. 
 7. Id. at 13 (quoting McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943)). 
 8. Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 500 (1974). 
 9. 318 U.S. 332 (1943). 
 10. See, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, The Supervisory Power of the Supreme Court, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 
324, 328–29 (2006); Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: 
Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433, 
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that federal defendants’ confessions had been improperly admitted 
against them because the defendants had been held in custody at length 
for questioning rather than being brought to court promptly as required 
by federal statutes.11 The defendants cited earlier decisions holding 
coerced confessions to be inadmissible as a matter of due process. But 
Justice Frankfurter’s opinion explained that the Court did not have to 
decide the constitutionality of the interrogations, because it could 
independently set standards of fair criminal process in federal cases: 
[W]hile the power of this Court to undo convictions in state courts is 
limited to the enforcement of those “fundamental principles of 
liberty and justice,” which are secured by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the scope of our reviewing power over convictions 
brought here from the federal courts is not confined to ascertainment 
of Constitutional validity. Judicial supervision of the administration 
of criminal justice in the federal courts implies the duty of 
establishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure and 
evidence. Such standards are not satisfied merely by observance of 
those minimal historic safeguards for securing trial by reason which 
are summarized as “due process of law” and below which we reach 
what is really trial by force. Moreover, review by this Court of state 
action expressing its notion of what will best further its own security 
in the administration of criminal justice demands appropriate 
respect for the deliberative judgment of a state in so basic an exercise 
of its jurisdiction. Considerations of large policy in making the 
necessary accommodations in our federal system are wholly 
irrelevant to the formulation and application of proper standards for 
the enforcement of the federal criminal law in the federal courts. 
The principles governing the admissibility of evidence in federal 
criminal trials have not been restricted, therefore, to those derived 
solely from the Constitution. In the exercise of its supervisory 
authority over the administration of criminal justice in the federal 
courts, this Court has, from the very beginning of its history, 
formulated rules of evidence to be applied in federal criminal 
 
1435 (1984); Dep’t of Justice, Office of Legal Policy, Report to the Attorney General on the Judiciary’s 
Use of Supervisory Power to Control Federal Law Enforcement Activity, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 773, 
775 (1989); Alfred Hill, The Bill of Rights and the Supervisory Power, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 193 
(1969). Federal courts’ supervisory authority over the criminal justice process can be distinguished 
from other sources of federal judicial regulatory authority, such as their “inherent authority  . . . to 
protect their own jurisdiction” and their authority to regulate lawyers. Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. 
Green, Federal Court Authority to Regulate Lawyers: A Practice in Search of a Theory?, 56 VAND. L. 
REV. 1303, 1311 (2003). 
 11. McNabb, 318 U.S. at 344–47. In a companion case, Anderson v. United States, the Court 
suppressed confessions based on the same considerations governing the McNabb decision. 318 U.S. 
350, 355 (1943). 
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prosecutions. And in formulating such rules of evidence for federal 
criminal trials the Court has been guided by considerations of justice 
not limited to the strict canons of evidentiary relevance.12 
As precedent for this exercise of judicial authority, the Court cited 
decisions going back to the early 1800s in which the Court ruled on the 
admissibility of evidence in federal criminal cases.13 
Over the ensuing decade, the Vinson Court adhered to the McNabb 
decision, which it rationalized as “an exercise of [the Court’s] duty to 
formulate policy appropriate for criminal trials in the federal courts.”14 
In a 1948 decision, the Vinson Court divided over its understanding of 
McNabb’s implications for the admissibility of confessions,15 with the 
majority holding a confession inadmissible because of a statutorily 
excessive delay in bringing the arrested defendant before a judicial 
officer.16 But even the dissent acknowledged that “[w]hen not 
inconsistent with a statute, or the Constitution, there is no doubt of the 
power of this Court to institute, on its own initiative, reforms in the 
federal practice as to the admissibility of evidence in criminal trials in 
federal courts.”17 
The Vinson Court made stingy use of its supervisory authority, 
however. The only other examples were a pair of 1946 decisions 
condemning wholesale exclusions of groups from juries: Thiel v. 
Southern Pacific Co.,18 overturning a civil judgment where wage earners 
had been systematically excluded from the jury panel,19 followed by 
 
 12. McNabb, 318 U.S. at 340–41 (citations omitted). 
 13. Id. at 341 (citations omitted). Professor Pushaw has observed that two of the eight 
decisions cited by the Court “stand for the opposite principle” and that “[t]he other six were 
inapposite,” and “[t]he Court effectively adopted the rationale for general supervisory power that 
Justice Brandeis had advocated in a series of dissents in the 1920s: that the judiciary had 
independent authority to develop adjective law to preserve its integrity, quite apart from its duty 
to enforce the Constitution and federal statutes.” Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of 
Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 780–81 (2001). For other 
discussions of McNabb and its historical background, see Barrett, supra note 10, at 373–76; Beale, 
supra note 10, at 1435–48. 
 14. United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 68 (1944). In Mitchell, the Court found McNabb 
inapplicable because the defendant made his admissions before being held for an inordinate length 
of time. The Court also declined to extend McNabb in United States v. Bayer, where the trial court 
excluded a custodial confession obtained in violation of McNabb but admitted one voluntarily given 
by the defendant six months later. 331 U.S. 532, 540–41 (1947). 
 15. Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948). 
 16. Id. at 412–14. The Court applied the McNabb rule again in United States v. Carignan, another 
case involving a confession obtained after inordinate delay in bringing the defendant to court. 342 
U.S. 36, 41 (1951). 
 17. Upshaw, 335 U.S. at 414–15. 
 18. 328 U.S. 217 (1946). 
 19. Id. at 223–24. 
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Ballard v. United States,20 overturning a criminal conviction where 
women had been systemically excluded from the grand and petit 
juries.21 Notably, this pair of decisions went beyond questions of 
evidentiary admissibility in regulating federal practice. 
More often, the Vinson Court declined to employ its supervisory 
authority, although it accepted the legitimacy of this power. In Fisher v. 
United States,22 decided in 1946, the Court upheld a capital murder 
conviction where the District of Columbia trial judge refused to instruct 
the jury that it could take account of the defendant’s diminished mental 
capacity.23 Apparently regarding the District of Columbia as the 
equivalent of a state, the majority found supervisory authority 
inapplicable, observing, “[t]he administration of criminal law in matters 
not affected by Constitutional limitations or a general federal law is a 
matter peculiarly of local concern.”24 In Pinkerton v. United States,25 
decided soon after, the Court essentially ignored the dissent’s argument 
that, as a matter of supervisory authority, the Court should not allow a 
federal defendant to be sentenced both for conspiracy and for 
substantive offenses for which he was convicted only by virtue of his 
participation in the underlying conspiracy.26 
In its 1952 decision in On Lee v. United States,27 the Court similarly 
declined the dissent’s invitation to invoke supervisory authority. There, 
the Court held that an undercover investigator’s secret recording of his 
conversations with the defendant was admissible. After concluding that 
the recording did not violate the Fourth Amendment or the relevant 
federal statute, the Court refused to exclude the recording based on its 
supervisory authority.28 Four dissenting Justices regarded the 
investigator’s conduct as so distasteful—“‘dirty business,’” Justice 
Frankfurter called it29—that the prosecution should be barred from 
exploiting it, but the majority concluded that the Court’s “disapproval 
must not be thought to justify a social policy of the magnitude necessary 
to arbitrarily exclude otherwise relevant evidence.”30 
 
 20. 329 U.S. 187 (1946). 
 21. Id. at 195–96. 
 22. 328 U.S. 463 (1946). 
 23. Id. at 464, 470. 
 24. Id. at 476. See also Eagles v. United States, 329 U.S. 304, 315 (1946) (stating that supervisory 
authority did not apply in the habeas context). 
 25. 328 U.S. 640 (1946). 
 26. See id. at 650–54 (Rutledge, J., dissenting in part). 
 27. 343 U.S. 747 (1952). 
 28. Id. at 754–58. 
 29. Id. at 760 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 30. Id. at 757. 
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III. THE EARLY WARREN COURT’S OFFUTT DECISION 
Earl Warren became Chief Justice in 1953.31 The following year, 
starting with United States v. Offutt,32 the Warren Court began to employ 
supervisory authority more robustly to rectify perceived procedural 
injustices in federal criminal cases, often in a manner that expanded 
procedural protections for federal criminal defendants generally.33 
Offutt defended a doctor accused of performing an abortion in the 
District of Columbia.34 Throughout the fourteen day trial, Offutt clashed 
with the federal district judge, and “with increasing personal overtones,” 
the judge admonished Offutt and threatened to hold him in contempt for 
disobeying the court’s rulings and for overly aggressive advocacy.35 In 
Justice Frankfurter’s description, “these interchanges between court and 
counsel were marked by expressions and revealed an attitude which 
hardly reflected the restraints of conventional judicial demeanor.”36 
After the jury began deliberating, the judge initiated summary criminal 
contempt proceedings.37 
Without specifying the charges against Offutt or providing an 
evidentiary hearing, the judge made twelve findings of contempt and 
sentenced Offutt to ten days’ imprisonment.38 On appeal, the court of 
appeals sustained four of the twelve findings and reduced Offutt’s 
sentence to two days’ imprisonment, while reversing the doctor’s 
criminal conviction in a separate opinion because the judge’s 
antagonistic behavior made the doctor’s trial unfair.39 
Justice Frankfurter’s majority opinion signaled that the Court was 
revitalizing its supervisory authority. Quoting McNabb, he explained 
that the Court had decided to review Offutt’s conviction “[i]n view of this 
Court’s ‘supervisory authority over the administration of criminal 
justice in the federal courts,’ and the importance of assuring alert self-
restraint in the exercise by district judges of the summary power for 
punishing contempt.”40 This explanation is somewhat suspect, given that 
 
 31. Archibald Cox, Chief Justice Earl Warren, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1969). 
 32. 348 U.S. 11 (1954). 
 33. See generally Beale, supra note 10,
 
at 1448–55 (describing how supervisory power has 
expanded the general rules of procedure and evidence, creating more fairness and reliable criminal 
proceedings). 
 34. Offutt, 348 U.S. at 12. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 12–13. 
 40. Id. at 13 (citing McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943)). Justice Frankfurter was 
well aware that in reviewing a federal criminal contempt conviction, the Court had no need to rely 
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neither Offutt’s petition for certiorari nor the Government’s opposition 
cited McNabb—nor, for that matter, did the parties’ briefs on the 
merits.41 Moreover, the Court had ample authority to review the process 
leading to Offutt’s conviction without reference to either constitutional 
limits or supervisory authority. As it did in prior federal criminal 
contempt cases both predating and postdating McNabb, the Court could 
simply have analyzed whether the trial court exceeded its inherent 
authority, or its authority under Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, to punish criminal contempt summarily.42 
The Court did not question whether Offutt’s conduct was 
sanctionable but focused on the fairness of the process by which he was 
punished.43 “The vital point,” Justice Frankfurter observed, “is that in 
sitting in judgment on such a misbehaving lawyer the judge should not 
himself give vent to personal spleen or respond to a personal grievance. 
These are subtle matters, for they concern the ingredients of what 
constitutes justice. Therefore, justice must satisfy the appearance of 
justice.”44 The opinion concluded that the contempt proceedings should 
have been conducted by a different judge, because “instead of 
representing the impersonal authority of law, the trial judge permitted 
himself to become personally embroiled with the petitioner,” and 
therefore he could not be counted on to preside impartially.45 
IV. THE RISE OF SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY IN THE EARLY WARREN 
COURT 
From a constitutional perspective, the Court’s Offutt opinion was an 
exercise of restraint.46 Offutt argued that he had been denied the Fifth 
Amendment due process right to an impartial judge, to notice, and to a 
 
on the supervisory authority that he had previously discussed in McNabb. His scholarship, while 
teaching at Harvard Law School, included an article deeply exploring the history bearing on federal 
courts’ authority, under federal law, to punish criminal contempt, and exposing the Court’s 
mischaracterization of the federal law in Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402 (1918). 
See Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, Power of Congress over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in 
“Inferior” Federal Courts—A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1010, 1029–38 (1924). 
In Nye v. United States, the Court accepted the article’s account and corrected its earlier error. 313 
U.S. 33, 47–48 (1941). 
 41. See generally Brief for the United States, Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954) (No. 27); 
Reply Brief for Petitioner, Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954) (No. 27) [hereinafter Pet’r’s 
Reply Br.] (neither referring to McNabb at all). 
 42. See, e.g., Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952); In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224 (1945). 
       43.
   
Offutt, 348 U.S. at 17. 
 44. Id. at 14. 
 45. Id. at 17. 
 46. See Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 929 
(1965). 
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hearing.47 Had the Court agreed, its decision would have applied directly 
to state criminal cases, since the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
Clause, applicable to the states, presumably required the same elements 
of fair process as Fifth Amendment due process.48 Instead, although state 
courts might find the opinion to be persuasive, the Court’s ruling applied 
only in federal cases. 
At the same time, Offutt’s references to McNabb and to the Court’s 
“supervisory authority” gave the decision a potential significance 
beyond the criminal contempt context governed by Rule 42. As Justice 
Frankfurter explained in McNabb, in supervising federal proceedings, 
the Court was not limited by the Constitution’s “minimal historic 
safeguards for securing trial by reason.”49 Offutt might have been read as 
the rebirth of supervisory authority, encouraging the Supreme Court in 
future federal criminal cases to express “what constitutes justice” and 
inviting federal courts of appeals to do the same, using “the appearance 
of justice”—that is, the Justices’ own sense of procedural fairness and 
wise criminal justice policy—as the lodestar. 
Before it decided Mapp v. Ohio50 in 1961, the Court reviewed over a 
dozen other cases implicating its supervisory authority. The Warren 
Court used this power more generously than the Vinson Court. For 
example, in Roviaro v. United States,51 the Court rejected the 
government’s asserted right to withhold its informer’s identity, holding 
that the defendant was entitled on cross-examination to elicit the 
identity of an informer who was the only other participant in the alleged 
narcotics transaction.52 In Grunewald v. United States,53 while 
overturning all three defendants’ tax fraud conspiracy convictions on 
other grounds,54 the Court also invoked supervisory authority to hold it 
improper for the prosecution to cross-examine one of the defendants 
based on his invocation of the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination.55 
 
 47. See Pet’r’s Reply Br., supra note 41, at 2. 
 48. James W. Ely, Jr., Due Process Clause, THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONST., 
https://www.heritage.org/constitution/amendments/14/essays/170/due-process-clause (last 
visited Nov. 9, 2019) (“Modern lawn interprets the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to impose 
the same substantive due process and procedural due process requirements on the federal and 
state governments.”). 
 49. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943). 
 50. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 51. 353 U.S. 53 (1957). 
 52. Id. at 65. 
 53. 353 U.S. 391 (1957). 
 54. Id. at 424. 
 55. Id. at 423–24. The Court explained its decision to address the question as follows: 
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The Court later described Roviaro as an exercise of its traditional 
“power to formulate evidentiary rules for federal criminal cases,”56 and 
the same might be said of Grunewald. But other decisions expressed the 
Court’s willingness to establish other kinds of procedural safeguards in 
federal criminal cases. In a tax prosecution, the Court invoked 
supervisory power in ruling, in passing, that prosecutors must 
investigate defendants’ innocent explanations for unexplained increases 
in net worth that were alleged to be taxable income.57 In another case, 
the Court used its supervisory power to set aside a drug distribution 
conviction where the jury had read news accounts referring to the 
defendant’s prior convictions which had been ruled inadmissible.58 And 
in a particularly expansive exercise of supervisory authority, the Court 
barred a federal investigator from testifying in a state criminal 
proceeding about evidence that had been illegally obtained and 
suppressed in a federal criminal proceeding.59 This was before the Court 
held in Mapp that the Fourth Amendment applied to the states. Although 
the Court’s supervisory authority did not extend to state court 
proceedings, the Court thought it had authority to police the conduct of 
federal criminal agents. 
A high water mark for the Court’s supervisory power was Elkins v. 
United States,60 decided just one year before Mapp. Setting aside decades 
of decisions applying the so-called “silver platter” doctrine, the Court 
held that evidence obtained by state authorities is inadmissible in 
federal criminal proceedings if obtained in contravention of the 
restrictions that the Fourth Amendment imposes on federal 
investigators.61 The Court relied heavily on Justice Frankfurter’s 
 
We are not unmindful that the question whether a prior statement is sufficiently 
inconsistent to be allowed to go to the jury on the question of credibility is usually within 
the discretion of the trial judge. But where such evidentiary matter has grave constitutional 
overtones, as it does here, we feel justified in exercising this Court’s supervisory control to 
pass on such a question. 
 
Id. Grunewald anticipated the Court’s decision in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), which 
held that commenting on the defendant’s silence violates the Fifth Amendment right against self -
incrimination. Id. at 615. 
 56. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 312 (1967) (discussing Roviaro). 
 57. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 135–36 & n.7 (1954). 
 58. Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 313 (1959). 
 59. Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 217 (1956). The Court distinguished Rea in Wilson v. 
Schnettler, and then again in Clear v. Bolger, finding in both cases that federal courts could not 
exercise supervisory authority to enjoin federal agents from testifying in state cases about their 
acquisition of evidence. 365 U.S. 381, 386 (1961); 371 U.S. 392, 398–99 (1963). 
 60. 364 U.S. 206 (1960). 
 61. Id. at 223–24. 
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majority opinion in Wolf v. Colorado,62 holding that the core of the Fourth 
Amendment’s freedom from arbitrary police intrusions on privacy 
applies to the states by virtue of the Due Process Clause,63 even though 
the exclusionary rule does not.64 The Court thought that Wolf undercut 
the rationale of the earlier “silver platter” opinions,65 although Justice 
Frankfurter, who had authored the Court’s opinion in Wolf, disagreed 
and dissented in Elkins.66 The majority’s ruling in Elkins, excluding the 
evidence illegally obtained by the state, did not rest on the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule—it relied on the Court’s supervisory 
power, as recognized in McNabb.67 
This is not to say that the Court employed its supervisory authority 
at every opportunity.68 It declined to use supervisory authority to allow 
a court to dismiss an indictment not supported by competent evidence.69 
In another case, it declined the suggestion in a concurring opinion that it 
expand the entrapment defense as an exercise of supervisory 
authority.70 In another, it overturned a conviction on other grounds and 
therefore did not consider the dissent’s argument that it should do so as 
 
 62. 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
 63. Id. at 27–28. 
 64. Id. at 33. 
 65. Elkins, 364 U.S. at 213–14. 
 66. Id. at 237–41 (Frankfurter, J., with Clark, Harlan, and Whittaker, JJ., dissenting). 
 67. Id. at 216 (majority opinion) (“What is here invoked is the Court’s supervisory power over 
the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts, under which the Court has ‘from the very 
beginning of its history, formulated rules of evidence to be applied in federal criminal 
prosecution.’”) (quoting McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943)). Another search-and-
seizure case evidently relying on supervisory authority was Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 
480 (1958). There, the Court found that an arrest was invalid where the application did not set forth 
probable cause as required by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. at 485–87. The Court 
held that evidence seized pursuant to the arrest was inadmissible. Id. at 488. Although the decision 
did not refer to supervisory authority or McNabb, the opinion might be read, like McNabb, to require 
evidentiary suppression as a remedy for a violation of a procedural rule that does not explicitly 
provide for such a remedy. Giordenello was later identified as a supervisory powers decision. See 
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 118 (1964) (Clark, J., with Black, and Stewart, JJ., dissenting). 
 68. It is unclear whether the Court exercised its supervisory authority in Green v. United States 
to establish a rule for federal court judges. 365 U.S. 301 (1961) (plurality). The question was 
whether the district judge had provided the defendant an opportunity to speak on his own behalf 
regarding the sentence to be imposed, as required by a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure. Id. at 
303–04. To avoid future ambiguities, Justice Frankfurter wrote in a plurality opinion: “Trial judges 
before sentencing should, as a matter of good judicial administration, unambiguously address 
themselves to the defendant. Hereafter trial judges should leave no room for doubt that the 
defendant has been issued a personal invitation to speak prior to sentencing.” Id. at 305. Justice 
Stewart added in a concurrence: “I do think the better practice in sentencing is to assure the 
defendant an express opportunity to speak for himself, in addition to anything that his lawyer may 
have to say. I would apply such a rule prospectively, in the exercise of our supervisory capacity.” Id. 
at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring). In context, it appears that Justice Frankfurter’s pronouncement 
regarding what district judges “should” do rather than “must” do was slightly more precatory than 
an exercise of supervisory power. 
 69. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363–64 (1956). 
 70. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 376 (1958). 
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an exercise of supervisory authority.71 And in a criminal contempt case, 
the Court ignored the dissent’s argument for overturning the conviction 
as an exercise of supervisory authority.72 
However, none of the decisions suggested that the Court had any 
skepticism or discomfort regarding federal courts’ supervisory power. 
On the contrary, the Court extolled its supervisory authority in two 
decisions overturning judgments predicated on the testimony of 
government informants who were later revealed to have testified falsely 
elsewhere on similar subjects.73 In the first, citing McNabb, Justice 
Frankfurter wrote: 
The untainted administration of justice is certainly one of the most 
cherished aspects of our institutions. Its observance is one of our 
proudest boasts. This Court is charged with supervisory functions in 
relation to proceedings in the federal courts. Therefore, fastidious 
regard for the honor of the administration of justice requires the 
Court to make certain that the doing of justice be made so manifest 
that only irrational or perverse claims of its disregard can be 
asserted.74 
The Court quoted this encomium in the second case, setting aside a 
criminal conviction on essentially the same ground.75 
The Court continued to apply supervisory authority, as in McNabb, 
when a confession was obtained in violation of federal law requiring 
agents to bring an arrested defendant to court promptly.76 But the Court 
plainly did not think its power was limited to remedying violations of 
federal statutes, was confined to deciding questions of evidence in 
federal court, or was otherwise restrained when it came to questions of 
federal criminal process in or out of court. The Court assumed that it 
 
 71. Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 10 (1959); see id. at 17–18 (Clark, J., with Harlan, and 
Stewart, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 72. Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 42 (1959); see id. at 61–62 (Warren, C.J., with Black, 
Douglas, and Brennan, JJ., dissenting). 
 73. Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 351 U.S. 115, 125 
(1956) (overturning an administrative board’s determination that the Communist Party of the 
United States had to register as a communist organization); Mesaroch v. United States, 352 U.S. 1, 
14 (1956) (overturning a conviction for conspiring to advocate the overthrow of the government, 
because the government acknowledged that an informant who testified at the trial about his 
infiltration of the Communist Party had testified falsely in several other contemporaneous 
proceedings regarding the same subject). See also United States v. Shotwell, 355 U.S. 233, 242 
(1957) (vacating the court of appeals decision and remanding criminal case to the district court 
where, post-appeal, the Government submitted affidavits indicating that the defendants were 
relying on false testimony). 
 74. Communist Party, 351 U.S. at 124 (citations omitted). 
 75. Mesaroch, 352 U.S. at 14 (quoting Communist Party, 351 U.S. at 124). 
 76. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 451–53, 455 (1957). 
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could independently assess the propriety of federal investigative 
conduct to ensure, in the language of Offutt, that justice “satisf[ies] the 
appearance of justice.”77 In a state case upholding the constitutionality 
of a custodial interrogation although the defendant and his lawyer were 
denied access to each other, the Court observed that, in a federal case, it 
would surely have used its supervisory power to suppress the 
defendant’s confession based on its supervisory authority: 
We share the strong distaste expressed by the two lower courts over 
the episode disclosed by this record. Were this a federal prosecution 
we would have little difficulty in dealing with what occurred under 
our general supervisory power over the administration of justice in 
the federal courts. But to hold that what happened here violated the 
Constitution of the United States is quite another matter.78 
If, as scholars later observed, the early Warren Court was vague 
about the source and parameters of its supervisory authority,79 it was 
nonetheless confident in its possession of this power, in the breadth of 
this power, and in the obligation to employ it. 
V. THE WANING OF SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY IN THE LATER WARREN 
COURT 
It is generally agreed that the Warren Court’s criminal procedure 
“revolution” began with its 1961 decision in Mapp, holding states subject 
to the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule.80 The Court took its 
 
 77. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954). 
 78. Cicenia v. La Gay, 357 U.S. 504, 508–09 (1958) (citations omitted). See also Crooker v. 
California, 357 U.S. 433, 439 n.4 (1958). 
 
At times petitioner appears to urge “a rule” barring use of a voluntary confession obtained 
after state denial of a request to contact counsel regardless of whether any violation of a 
due process right to counsel occurred. That contention is simply an appeal to the 
supervisory power of this Court over the administration of justice in the federal courts. The 
short answer to such a contention here is that this conviction was had in a state, not a 
federal, court. 
 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 79. See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 10, at 329, 333. Scholars have considered or challenged various 
rationales for the Court’s exercise of this authority. See, e.g., id. at 387 (concluding that “the 
Constitution’s structure cuts against, and history rules out, the proposition that the Supreme Court 
possesses inherent supervisory power over inferior court procedure”); Beale, supra note 10, at 
1520–21 (concluding that “[t]he supervisory power label has been used to describe the exercise of 
several different forms of judicial power” and that none of them justifies “decisions that cannot be 
characterized as procedural or remedial in nature. . . . The exclusion of evidence or the dismissal of 
a prosecution because of constitutionally and statutorily permissible conduct by government 
investigators and prosecutors violates the separation of powers . . . .”). 
 80. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961). 
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earliest opportunity thereafter, in Ker v. California,81 to offer reassurance 
that the expectations of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment 
“are not susceptible of Procrustean application”82 and that “Mapp 
sounded no death knell for our federalism.”83 The opinion acknowledged 
that the Court had previously invoked its supervisory authority to 
establish rules for federal cases on the admissibility of evidence 
obtained by investigative agents, but promised that Mapp “established 
no assumption by this Court of supervisory authority over state courts, 
and, consequently, it implied no total obliteration of state laws relating 
to arrests and searches in favor of federal law.”84 
Notwithstanding this nod to states’ interest in regulating their own 
criminal procedure, the Warren Court expanded its docket of state 
criminal cases, applying the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments to the 
states in essentially the same way as to the federal government and 
interpreting these provisions more expansively than in the past. Gideon 
v. Wainwright,85 establishing indigent defendants’ right to appointed 
counsel in felony cases,86 became the foundation of a host of other 
subsequent right-to-counsel decisions.87 Miranda v. Arizona,88 famously 
requiring police to warn arrested defendants of their rights before 
questioning them,89 entered the national vocabulary. These and other 
decisions fundamentally altered national criminal practices. 
Even when reviewing federal criminal cases, the Court did not 
hesitate to decide on constitutional grounds, giving its opinions a 
precedential impact in state cases as well. For example, in Katz v. United 
 
 81. 374 U.S. 23 (1963). 
 82. Id. at 33. 
 83. Id. at 31. 
 84. Id. (citations omitted). 
 85. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 86. Id. at 338–39. 
 87. See Bruce A. Green, Gideon’s Amici: Why Do Prosecutors So Rarely Defend the Rights of the 
Accused?, 122 YALE L.J. 2336, 2338–39 (2013). 
 
Gideon leads to a right to assigned counsel for misdemeanor defendants facing 
imprisonment, and eventually to lawsuits challenging the adequacy of state funding for 
indigent criminal defense. The decision becomes the foundation for the right to competent 
and conflict-free counsel; protection from state and judicial interference with the lawyer-
client relationship and with one’s choice of counsel; and limits on police interrogations after 
formal charges are initiated. At least indirectly, Gideon opens the door to other procedural 
protections, both within and outside the criminal context, including a right to appointed 
counsel in some civil cases. 
 
Id. 
 88. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 89. Id. at 471–72. 
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States,90 rather than relying on supervisory authority, the Court held 
warrantless electronic eavesdropping to be unconstitutional under the 
Fourth Amendment.91 Likewise, in Massiah v. United States,92 the Court 
relied on the Sixth Amendment in holding that investigators and their 
informants could not secretly question indicted defendants.93 And in 
United States v. Wade,94 the Court extended the Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel to post-indictment line-ups,95 over a dissent that suggested 
that the ruling was questionable even as an exercise of supervisory 
authority.96 
The Court was mindful that it could not be as protective of fair 
process and individual interests when engaging in constitutional 
interpretation as when invoking its supervisory authority. For example, 
on the same day it decided Mapp, the Court held that, although it 
continued to adhere to McNabb, it was not extending McNabb to state 
courts as a matter of constitutional due process.97 Conversely, the 
Justices recognized that supervisory authority gave them more leeway 
to right wrongs.98 
But even so, the Court did not gravitate toward supervisory 
authority in federal cases as an exercise of constitutional restraint. When 
there were five votes for an expansive constitutional decision in a 
federal criminal case, the Court reached the constitutional question. For 
example, the Court held in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York 
Harbor99 that the right against self-incrimination precluded the state 
from compelling a witness to incriminate himself under federal law and 
 
 90. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 91. Id. at 353. 
 92. 377 U.S. 201 (1964). 
 93. Id. at 205–06. 
 94. 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
 95. Id. at 236–37. 
 96. Id. at 259 (White, J., with Harlan and Stewart, JJ., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
 97. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 600–01 (1961). 
 
The McNabb case was an innovation which derived from our concern and responsibility for 
fair modes of criminal proceeding in the federal courts. The States, in the large, have not 
adopted a similar exclusionary principle. And although we adhere unreservedly to McNabb 
for federal criminal cases, we have not extended its rule to state prosecutions as a 
requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
Id. 
 98. For example, in Rideau v. Louisiana, Justice Clark disagreed with the Court’s conclusion that 
the defendant had been denied due process by being tried in a venue where his prison interrogation, 
in which he made incriminating admissions, had been televised. 373 U.S. 723, 729 (1963) (Clark, J., 
with Harlan, J., dissenting). But he noted that in a federal case raising the same facts, he would have 
overturned the defendant’s conviction as an exercise of supervisory authority. Id. at 728–29. 
 99. 378 U.S. 52 (1964). 
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that, having done so, the witness’ testimony could not be used against 
him in federal court.100 In his concurrence, Justice Harlan read the Fifth 
Amendment right more narrowly but would have excluded the witness’ 
statements in federal proceedings as an exercise of supervisory 
authority.101 The Court turned down the opportunity to capture an 
additional Justice’s vote by taking the more restrained approach. 
With Justice Frankfurter’s retirement from the Court in 1962,102 the 
Court lost its most ardent proponent of supervisory power, the author 
of McNabb, Offutt, and other supervisory power opinions. The Court took 
no more cases like Offutt where it would claim to have accepted review 
precisely to consider a question of supervisory authority, and it evinced 
little interest in making new rules of federal criminal procedure based 
on supervisory power. Occasionally, dissenting Justices unpersuasively 
urged the Court to rule for the defendant on supervisory authority 
grounds.103 But if a procedure was not unjust enough to violate the Bill 
of Rights, and was not proscribed by a federal rule or statute, the Court 
was disinclined to establish or ratify further procedural restraints based 
on federal courts’ supervisory authority.104 For example, in Simmons v. 
United States,105 the Court held that a pretrial photo identification was 
not unnecessarily suggestive and therefore inadmissible either under 
 
 100. Id. at 77–78. 
 101. Id. at 80–81 (Harlan, J., with Clark, J., concurring). 
 102. See John M. Harlan, The Frankfurter Imprint as Seen by a Colleague, 176 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1 
(1962) (written “[o]n the occasion of [Justice Frankfurter’s] retirement from the Court”). 
 103. See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 320 (1966) (Warren, C.J., dissenting) 
(maintaining the evidence should be suppressed as a matter of supervisory power); Berman v. 
United States, 378 U.S. 530, 533–34 (1963) (Black, J., with Douglas, C.J., and Goldberg, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that Court should have exercised its supervisory authority to reinstate the defendant’s 
untimely appeal); Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 341, 388–89 (1963) (Black, J., with 
Warren, C.J., and Douglas, J., dissenting). In ruling for the federal criminal appellant on statutory 
grounds in Hardy v. United States, the Court declined an opportunity to use its supervisory authority 
to establish a more protective rule for future federal criminal appeals. 375 U.S. 277, 282 (1964). The 
Court held that an indigent criminal defendant who has a new lawyer on appeal has a statutory right 
to the full trial transcript, and not only those portions addressing the issues that the defendant, 
before obtaining appellate counsel, expressed an intent to raise. Id. But the Court ignored Justice 
Goldberg’s suggestion that “in the interests of justice this Court should require, under our 
supervisory power, that full transcripts be provided, without limitation, in all federal criminal cases 
to defendants who cannot afford to purchase them, whenever they seek to prosecute an appeal.” Id. 
(Goldberg, J., with Brennan, C.J., and Stewart, J., concurring). 
 104. See, e.g., Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 326–27 (1966) (rejecting the argument that 
evidence should be excluded on constitutional grounds or under supervisory authority); Lopez v. 
United States, 373 U.S. 427, 440 (1963) (rejecting the Fourth Amendment challenge to admission of 
a consensual recorded conversation and declining to exclude evidence under supervisory authority, 
explaining: “[T]he court’s inherent power to refuse to receive material evidence is a power that 
must be sparingly exercised”); Cleary v. Bolger, 371 U.S. 392, 398, 400 (1963) (holding that the 
federal court could not enjoin introduction of evidence in state court). 
 105. 390 U.S. 377 (1968). 
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the Due Process Clause or pursuant to supervisory authority.106 The 
Court did not put forward a different, and more protective, approach to 
the admissibility of identification evidence in federal cases. 
The Court did invoke supervisory authority in a case of little 
significance to call for the correction of an obvious sentencing error,107 
and in another to give effect to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure.108 And, as in Offutt, the Court’s supervisory authority was the 
apparent basis for two decisions overturning federal criminal contempt 
convictions. In one, the Court held that a trial judge employing the 
summary contempt power may not impose a prison sentence of more 
than six months.109 In the other, the Court overturned a summary 
contempt conviction against a lawyer who, to make a record for appeal, 
repeatedly asked questions contrary to the judge’s instructions to stop 
the questioning.110 But it seems fair to say that that the Court let its 
 
 106. Id. at 381–86. The Court held as a matter of due process “that convictions based on 
eyewitness identification at trial following a pretrial identification by photograph will be set aside 
on that ground only if the photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive 
as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” Id. at 384. 
 107. Bartone v. United States, 375 U.S. 52, 53–54 (1963). The Court held that the court of appeals 
should have corrected the error immediately rather than requiring the defendant to file a separate 
motion after the appeal was decided. It explained that “in federal proceedings, over which both the 
[c]ourts of [a]ppeals and this Court have broad powers of supervision,” the court of appeals, 
“whenever possible, [should] correct errors reachable by the appeal rather than remit the parties 
to a new collateral proceeding.” Id. at 54 (citing McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943)). 
 108. In McCarthy v. United States, the Court set aside a guilty plea where the district judge failed 
to question the defendant as required by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to 
ensure that the defendant understood the charges. 394 U.S. 459, 463–64 (1969) (“This decision is 
based solely upon our construction of Rule 11 and is made pursuant to our supervisory power over 
the lower federal courts; we do not reach any of the constitutional arguments petitioner urges as 
additional grounds for reversal.”). Justice Black filed a short concurrence suggesting that the 
decision could have been reached based exclusively on Rule 11, without regard to supervisory 
power. Id. at 477 (Black, J., concurring). 
 109. Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 380 (1966) (plurality) (“[I]n the exercise of the 
Court’s supervisory power and under the peculiar power of the federal courts to revise sentences 
in contempt cases, we rule further that sentences exceeding six months for criminal contempt may 
not be imposed by federal courts absent a jury trial or waiver thereof.”). The parties in the case 
argued the constitutionality of the process, and two justices were prepared to rule on constitutional 
grounds. See id. at 375; id. at 384–93 (Douglas, J., with Black, J., dissenting). 
 110. In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230, 235–36 (1962). The dissent acknowledged the Court’s 
decision to be an exercise of supervisory authority. Id. at 237 (Harlan, J., with Stewart, J., dissenting). 
In a third contempt case, the Court declined to invoke its supervisory authority. In Piemonte v. 
United States, the trial judge summarily held a prison inmate in contempt for refusing, under a grant 
of immunity, to answer questions about narcotics dealing, on the ground that he and his family 
would be endangered if he complied. 367 U.S. 556, 558–59 (1961). In his dissenting opinion, Chief 
Justice Warren maintained that “even if the Court is unwilling to recognize that the Constitution 
prohibits the imposition of punishment in a summary proceeding, it ought to exercise its 
supervisory power over the lower federal courts to rectify the abuse of the summary contempt 
power which the record in this case makes manifest.” Id. at 564 (Warren, C.J., with Douglas, J., 
dissenting) (citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954)). 
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supervisory power atrophy.111 With respect to the exercise of 
supervisory power, the later Warren Court was almost as stingy as the 
Vinson Court had been after McNabb. 
One certainly could not infer that the later Warren Court was hostile 
to supervisory authority as the means of influencing the development of 
criminal procedure. That was important because, as Sara Sun Beale 
described in her seminal 1984 article on supervisory authority, lower 
federal courts, on the example of the Court’s earlier decisions, made 
robust use of supervisory power into and throughout the 1970s.112 
Nothing in the later Warren Court decisions would have discouraged 
them from doing so. In its later years, the Warren Court was merely 
indifferent, having discovered the shiny new power of constitutional 
interpretation. 
But one might have read into the later decisions an implication, no 
doubt unintended, that supervisory authority had nothing more to say 
on the subjects, such as searches and seizures and police interrogations, 
that the constitutional decisions directly addressed. In other words, 
supervisory power might now be understood as interstitial, potentially 
superseded not only by legislation but by constitutional decisions of 
limited reach.113 In effect, the constitutional case law risked crowding 
out supervisory power, turning the Constitution into not only a floor but, 
as far as the Court was concerned, a ceiling, contrary to how the Court 
had previously articulated the relationship between the constitutional 
criminal procedure rights and supervisory power. 
 
 111. A similar point has been made about the loss of focus on fairness with the Court’s 
abandonment of “due process” in favor of enumerated Bill of Rights provisions. See Donald A. 
Dripps, Justice Harlan on Criminal Procedure: Two Cheers for the Legal Process School , 3 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 125, 145–46 (2005); Tracey L. Meares, Everything Old Is New Again: Fundamental Fairness 
and the Legitimacy of Criminal Justice, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 105, 111–15 (2005); see also George C. 
Thomas III, The Criminal Procedure Road Not Taken: Due Process and the Protection of Innocence , 3 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 169, 169–70 (2005). 
 112. See Beale, supra note 10, at 1455–64. For example, some federal courts of appeals required 
district judges to inquire into whether a lawyer representing multiple defendants had a conflict of 
interest, before a rule of criminal procedure imposed that requirement. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 
U.S. 335, 346 n.10 (1980) (noting, “we view such an exercise of the supervisory power as a desirable 
practice”). And at least one court of appeals established a presumption that indicted defendants be 
tried within six months, otherwise the case would be dismissed. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 523, 
530 n.29 (1972) (noting that the Court’s decision cast no doubt on the appellate court’s rule). 
 113. Cf. Pushaw, supra note 13, at 746–47 (“[T]he Court has confined ‘federal common law’ to 
situations of genuine necessity, such as filling gaps in the Constitution or Acts of Congress.”). 
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VI. THE POST-WARREN COURT’S EROSION OF FEDERAL COURTS’ 
SUPERVISORY POWER 
The Burger Court started out where the Warren Court left off, 
somewhat indifferent to supervisory power. The Court acknowledged 
that federal courts possessed the authority to set standards that were 
not constitutionally compelled for federal criminal trials.114 But the 
Court did not go out of its way to use this authority itself.115 
In the 1980s, however, the Court turned hostile, issuing opinions 
cutting back on federal courts’ ability to “formulate policy” for federal 
criminal trials. In the first, United States v. Payner,116 the federal trial 
judge suppressed financial records that investigators obtained for use 
against the defendant through a “flagrantly illegal” search of a bank 
official.117 The evidence could not be suppressed under the Fourth 
Amendment, because the defendant had not himself been searched, and 
therefore he lacked standing to raise the constitutional claim.118 But the 
 
 114. The Court so recognized in Cupp v. Naughten, which concerned a state court’s jury 
instruction that witnesses should be presumed to have testified truthfully. 414 U.S. 141, 149 (1973). 
The Court noted that the instruction was universally condemned by federal courts of appeals. Id. at 
143, 146. But the Court characterized the federal court decisions as exercises of supervisory 
authority, not constitutional interpretation. Id. at 145–46. 
 
A reading of these cases, however, indicates that the courts of appeals were primarily 
concerned with directing inferior courts within the same jurisdiction to refrain from giving 
the instruction because it was thought confusing, of little positive value to the jury, or 
simply undesirable. The appellate courts were, in effect, exercising the so-called 
supervisory power of an appellate court to review proceedings of trial courts and to reverse 
judgments of such courts which the appellate court concludes were wrong. 
 
Id. at 145–46. Something more would be required, the Court suggested, to find that the jury 
instruction violated due process. Id. at 146 (“Before a federal court may overturn a conviction 
resulting from a state trial in which this instruction was used, it must be established not merely that 
the instruction is undesirable, erroneous, or even ‘universally condemned,’ but that it violated some 
right which was guaranteed to the defendant by the Fourteenth Amendment.”). See also Ristaino v. 
Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 598 n.10 (1976) (analogizing the case to an earlier decision, overturning a 
conviction because of the trial judge’s failure to inquire into the jury venire’s racial prejudice, that 
“should be recognized as an exercise of our supervisory power over federal courts”); Donnelly v. 
DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 648 n.23 (1974) (“We do not, by this decision, in any way condone 
prosecutorial misconduct, and we believe that trial courts, by admonition and instruction, and 
appellate courts, by proper exercise of their supervisory power, will continue to discourage it.”). 
 115. In United States v. Hale, the Court invoked supervisory power, not as means of expanding 
influence over federal criminal process, but as a way to avoid deciding a constitutional question. 
422 U.S. 171, 181 (1975). The Court held that the prosecution could not introduce evidence about, 
and draw incriminating inferences from, the defendant’s invocation of the right to remain silent 
after being arrested. Id. The court of appeals had held that using this evidence violated the 
defendant’s Miranda right. Id. at 173. And in United States v. Caceres, the Court declined to exercise 
supervisory authority to suppress evidence obtained in a tax investigation in violation of a federal 
tax regulation. 440 U.S. 741, 755–56 & n.22 (1979). 
 116. 447 U.S. 727 (1980). 
 117. Id. at 729. 
 118. Id. at 731–32. 
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trial court suppressed the evidence as an exercise of its supervisory 
power.119 The Court reversed, holding that “the supervisory power does 
not authorize a federal court to suppress otherwise admissible evidence 
on the ground that it was seized unlawfully from a third party not before 
the court.”120 The Court reasoned that the same societal interest in the 
admission of probative evidence that foreclosed the application of the 
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule equally foreclosed this use of 
supervisory authority.121 It claimed support for this view from Elkins v. 
United States, which, it said, “called for a restrained application of the 
supervisory power.”122 The opinion departed from earlier precedent 
which, as Justice Marshall observed in his dissent, included several cases 
where, although the Fourth Amendment afforded no remedy, the Court 
employed supervisory authority to suppress evidence obtained through 
government misconduct.123 Elkins was among the most notable of those 
prior cases, making the Court’s reliance on Elkins particularly 
confounding. 
Then in United States v. Hasting,124 decided three years later, the 
Court concluded that the harmless error rule limited federal courts’ 
exercise of supervisory power. In Hasting, the court of appeals 
overturned the defendant’s conviction because the prosecutor referred 
in his closing argument to the defendant’s failure to present evidence.125 
The appellate court evidently concluded that, like a comment on a 
defendant’s failure to testify, a comment on the absence of contrary 
evidence violated the defendant’s right against self-incrimination.126 The 
Court reversed, finding that, even assuming the prosecutor’s argument 
was constitutionally impermissible, it was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt and therefore was not grounds to set aside a criminal 
 
 119. Id. at 731. 
 120. Id. at 735. 
 121. Id. at 734–35. 
 122. Id. at 735 (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 216 (1960)). 
 123. Id. at 744 (Marshall, J., with Brennan, and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting). 
 
This Court has on several occasions exercised its supervisory powers over the federal 
judicial system in order to suppress evidence that the Government obtained through 
misconduct. The rationale for such suppression of evidence is twofold: to deter illegal 
conduct by Government officials, and to protect the integrity of the federal courts. The Court 
has particularly stressed the need to use supervisory powers to prevent the federal courts 
from becoming accomplices to such misconduct. 
 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 124. 461 U.S. 499 (1983). 
 125. Id. at 504, 512. 
 126. Id. at 503. 
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conviction.127 Although the appellate court did not expressly justify its 
decision based on supervisory authority, Chief Justice Burger’s opinion 
for the Court went out of its way to hold that, because the allegedly 
improper argument was harmless, the reviewing court likewise could 
not employ its supervisory authority to set aside the conviction.128 Along 
the way, the Court rationalized this authority narrowly: “The purposes 
underlying use of the supervisory powers are threefold: to implement a 
remedy for violation of recognized rights; to preserve judicial integrity 
by ensuring that a conviction rests on appropriate considerations validly 
before the jury; and finally, as a remedy designed to deter illegal 
conduct.”129 This was a far cry from earlier expansive (if under-theorized 
or unpersuasive) descriptions of supervisory authority, such as Justice 
Frankfurter’s claim in McNabb that this authority expressed federal 
courts’ “duty of establishing and maintaining civilized standards of 
procedure and evidence.”130 
Four Justices declined to join the new Chief Justice’s Hasting 
opinion gratuitously eviscerating federal courts’ supervisory authority. 
Justice Blackmun would have remanded for a consideration of whether 
the perceived constitutional violation was in fact harmless error.131 
Justice Stevens would have found that the prosecutor’s comment was 
constitutionally permissible and not addressed supervisory power.132 
And, joined by Justice Marshall, Justice Brennan took issue with the 
Court’s cramped understanding of supervisory power.133 While 
acknowledging that constitutionally impermissible jury arguments are 
subject to the harmless error rule, he concluded: “[T]he supervisory 
powers of federal appellate courts provide another possible source of 
authority, under some carefully confined circumstances, either to forgo 
a harmless error inquiry or to reverse a conviction even though the error 
at issue is harmless.”134 
Payner and Hasting discouraged federal courts’ development of an 
expansive sub-constitutional jurisprudence of criminal procedure.135 
 
 127. Id. at 507–12. 
 128. Id. at 505–07. 
 129. Id. at 505 (citations omitted). 
 130. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943). 
 131. Hasting, 461 U.S. at 512 (synopsis of Justice Blackmun’s position). 
 132. Id. at 512–13 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 133. Id. at 521–28 (Brennan, J., with Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 134. Id. at 525. 
 135. See Beale, supra note 10, at 1462 (reading Payner and Hasting to establish that lower courts’ 
supervisory power is subject to limitations on constitutional remedies). The Court may be more 
hospitable to supervisory authority when it leads to rules that disfavor criminal defendants. See 
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985) (upholding rule, issued by court of appeals pursuant to 
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Over the past three decades, while reaffirming federal courts’ 
supervisory authority, the Court has held that authority tightly reined.136 
In the lower federal courts, the robust use of supervisory authority 
described by Professor Beale seems to have drawn to an end as well, 
although there certainly continue to be examples of individual federal 
judges and lower federal courts adopting rules and issuing rulings 
protective of criminal defendants’ procedural rights based on 
supervisory authority.137 And, given the increased conservatism of the 
lower court federal judges, one might doubt whether a significantly 
more robust set of laws would have developed even if the Supreme Court 
had not tapped on the brakes. 
VII. CONCLUSION: OFFUTT’S LEGACY 
After Mapp, the Warren Court might have continued to invoke its 
supervisory authority in federal criminal cases, developing a federal 
criminal procedure jurisprudence running parallel to its expanding state 
criminal procedure jurisprudence premised on the Bill of Rights 
provisions. In federal cases, the Court would not have been limited to 
establishing the constitutional floor; nor would it have been compelled 
to exercise restraint out of respect for state courts and state processes. 
To promote the reliability and integrity of federal proceedings, the Court 
could have asserted its own view of fair process not only in adjudication 
but in criminal investigations, including with regard to police 
interrogations and searches and seizures. To be sure, a robust 
supervisory authority jurisprudence would not have bound state courts, 
where most criminal cases are brought. But the Warren Court’s 
 
supervisory authority, requiring habeas petitioner to object to magistrate’s report in order to 
preserve issues for appeal). 
 136. See, e.g., Peguero v. United States, 526 U.S. 23, 29–30 (1999) (holding that a district court’s 
failure to advise a convicted defendant of the right to appeal is subject to the harmless error rule); 
Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 425–28 (1996) (holding district court may not invoke 
supervisory authority to enter a judgment of acquittal where the defendant has not filed a timely 
motion); United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992) (finding district court may not use 
supervisory authority to dismiss indictment where the prosecution failed to introduce substantial 
exculpatory evidence to the grand jury); Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254 
(1988) (holding that a federal district court may not use supervisory authority to remedy grand 
jury misconduct that is harmless); cf. Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1892 (2016) (addressing 
limits on federal district courts’ supervisory authority in civil cases). In some cases, defendants have 
benefitted from the Court’s restriction on supervisory authority. See, e.g., Ortega-Rodriguez v. 
United States, 507 U.S. 234, 244 (1993) (finding appellate court may not exercise supervisory 
authority to dismiss the appeal of a fugitive defendant who has been recaptured). 
 137. See Jessica A. Roth, The “New” District Court Activism in Criminal Justice Reform, 72 N.Y.U. 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 187, 223–28 (2018) (discussing district courts’ adoption of discovery rules and 
rulings that are more demanding than constitutional case law and statutes). 
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approach might have influenced state courts in the exercise of their own 
supervisory authority. State courts might have been hard-pressed to 
explain why, in supervising state criminal proceedings, they should be 
less protective or fair than the U.S. Supreme Court and lower federal 
courts. Further, the Supreme Court’s supervisory authority decisions 
expanding procedural protections in the federal criminal context might 
have served as intermediate steps toward more protective 
interpretations of the constitutional provisions. We might then identify 
Offutt as the Warren Court decision that, building on Justice 
Frankfurter’s decision in McNabb, launched a criminal procedure 
revolution. But, of course, none of this occurred. 
To the extent that Offutt opened the way for the early Warren 
Court’s burst of expansive criminal procedure rulings for federal courts, 
predicated on its supervisory power, Offutt’s legacy is a modest one. By 
focusing on constitutional interpretation in its later years, to the virtual 
exclusion of supervisory power, the Warren Court failed to solidify its 
earlier gains. It never elaborated a persuasive rationale for the 
expansive uses of this authority and failed to demonstrate how 
supervisory power could be employed to build on, but go beyond, the 
constitutional framework. This made it easier for more conservative 
Courts to cut back on the early Warren Court’s supervisory-power 
decisions, just as they cut back on the later Warren Court’s constitutional 
criminal procedure decisions. 
Although it turned out to be Mapp, not Offutt, that launched the 
Warren Court’s criminal procedure revolution, Offutt is not entirely 
forgotten. It is still occasionally referenced within the narrow confines 
of contempt-of-court cases. For example, in Taylor v. Hayes,138 the Court 
found Offutt useful in reviewing a state court conviction for 
constitutional error.139 In Taylor, a criminal defense lawyer in a murder 
case engaged in a running controversy with the state trial judge, who 
held the lawyer in criminal contempt after the trial.140 Relying on Offutt, 
the Court held that in such circumstances, unless summary contempt 
power is exercised at the time of the contumacious conduct, 
constitutional due process requires notice and an opportunity to be 
heard by a disinterested judge.141 
In reviewing criminal contempt convictions, the Court continues to 
revert to its supervisory authority. Its most notable contemporary use 
 
 138. Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974). 
 139. Id. at 500, 502−03. 
 140. Id. at 489−90. 
 141. Id. at 502−03. 
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of this power was in Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton Et Fils S.A.,142 
holding that, in a contempt-of-court prosecution for violation of a court 
order, a trial judge may not appoint the victim’s lawyer to prosecute the 
case, but must appoint a disinterested lawyer.143 The Court might have 
gone a different route if five Justices were prepared to hold that there is 
a due process right to be prosecuted by a disinterested lawyer,144 as 
lower courts have done.145 But, citing Offutt and other earlier contempt 
cases, the Court expressed enthusiasm for supervisory authority in the 
federal criminal contempt context: 
The use of this Court’s supervisory authority has played a prominent 
role in ensuring that contempt proceedings are conducted in a 
manner consistent with basic notions of fairness. The exercise of 
supervisory authority is especially appropriate in the determination 
of the procedures to be employed by courts to enforce their orders, a 
subject that directly concerns the functioning of the Judiciary. We 
rely today on that authority to hold that counsel for a party that is the 
beneficiary of a court order may not be appointed as prosecutor in a 
contempt action alleging a violation of that order.146 
Although arising in a narrow class of criminal cases, contempt-of-court 
decisions such as Offutt and Young are important expressions of our 
ideas and ideals about fair criminal process. The very idea of the 
summary criminal contempt process, in which the trial judge serves 
essentially as grand jury, prosecutor, victim, witness, trial judge, and 
sentencer, challenges ordinary notions of fair process. Where the trial 
judge is, or regards himself as, the victim of the defendant’s contempt, 
that is a bridge too far, at least, as in Offutt and Taylor, if the contempt 
sanction is not issued immediately to preserve order in the courtroom. 
Likewise, while a judge may initiate contempt proceedings and assign a 
member of the bar to prosecute them, assigning a lawyer who owes a 
duty of loyalty to the victim of the contempt, as in Young, denies the 
 
 142. 481 U.S. 787 (1987) (plurality). 
 143. Id. at 804. 
 144. One justice took this view. See id. at 814–15 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 145. See Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Rethinking Prosecutors’ Conflicts of Interest, 58 B.C. L. 
REV. 463, 488–89 & n.116 (2017) (citing authority); Patricia Moran, Private Prosecutors in Criminal 
Contempt Actions Under Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure , 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1141, 1157 n.64 (1986) (citing authority); see also Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Delegation of the Criminal 
Prosecution Function to Private Actors, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 411, 424 n.39, 439 n.99 (2009); Bennett 
L. Gershman, Prosecutorial Ethics and Victims’ Rights: The Prosecutor’s Duty of Neutrality, 9 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 559, 562 (2005). 
 146. Young, 481 U.S. at 808–09 (citing Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 380 (1966) 
(plurality); Yates v. United States, 356 U.S. 363, 366–67 (1958) (per curiam); and Offutt v. United 
States, 348 U.S. 11, 17–18 (1954)). 
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defendant a prosecution by a lawyer who, in exercising discretion, can 
be expected to adhere to the prosecutorial norm of “seeking justice.” It 
is meaningful for the reviewing Court to use its supervisory power to 
right procedural wrongs in these federal cases. 
In retrospect, however, the criminal contempt decisions 
recognizing defendants’ procedural rights in the federal criminal context 
can just as easily be read as conservative decisions, restricting federal 
district courts’ authority. Federal district courts’ contempt power, 
although recognized by federal rule, derives from the courts’ inherent 
authority to control their processes. Decisions such as Offutt and Young 
restrain district courts’ authority, just as Payton and Hasting do. In that 
respect, they fit right in with the conservative criminal procedure 
jurisprudence of the post-Warren Court. 
Offutt also survives as a recognition that judges are human, 
emotional and fallible, and that at times various law and judicial 
decisions governing the criminal process must take account of the 
reality of judges’ human limitations.147 Most of the time, judges are 
trusted—perhaps unrealistically—to overcome self-interest and 
partisan political preferences, to ignore inadmissible evidence and 
irrelevant considerations, and to exercise reason rather than emotion. 
But Offutt illustrates that sometimes judges fail to do what the law 
presumes they will do, cannot reasonably be expected to do what the 
law expects, or will not reasonably appear capable of doing so. The lines 
are necessarily imprecise, and the presumption of impartiality is a 
strong one. But canons of judicial conduct identify circumstances where 
judges must recuse themselves because their impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned.148 With occasional cites to Offutt,149 courts 
sometimes reassign cases where the assigned judge cannot be trusted to 
be impartial, or where public confidence in the judge’s impartiality is 
 
 147. See generally Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Judicial Activism in Trial Courts, 74 N.Y.U. 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 365, 374 (2019) (describing the judge in Offutt as one “who takes grievances too 
personally and strikes back”). 
 148. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT: CANON 2: RULE 2.11: DISQUALIFICATION (American Bar 
Ass’n 2010). 
 149. See, e.g., United States v. Torkington, 874 F.2d 1441, 1446 (11th
 
Cir. 1989). 
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reasonably diminished.150 And, in extreme cases, verdicts are 
overturned because of judicial bias.151 
And finally, in Justice Frankfurter’s injunction that “justice must 
satisfy the appearance of justice,”152 Offutt provides an anthem for the 
federal criminal procedure revolution that might have been. This was 
the revolution that the Warren Court might have launched in tandem 
with its constitutional criminal procedure revolution. This was the 
revolution in which federal courts, in common law fashion, developed a 
jurisprudence of fair process that was not constricted by constitutional 
provisions establishing the minimally tolerable criminal procedures and 
that was not constrained by the need to respect individual state 
variations. This was the revolution that aimed higher for the federal 
courts, modeling how a civilized society treats some of its most 
vulnerable citizens. 
 
 150. A notable example was Ligon v. City of New York, the Second Circuit’s removal of the district 
judge presiding over a challenge to the constitutionality of the New York City police department’s 
stop-and-frisk practices. 538 Fed. App’x 101, 102–03 (2d Cir. 2013). See Bruce A. Green, Legal 
Discourse and Racial Justice: The Urge to Cry “Bias!”, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 177 (2015); Anil Kalhan, 
Stop and Frisk, Judicial Independence, and the Ironies of Improper Appearances, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
1043 (2014). 
 151. See, e.g., Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899 (2016); Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 
556 U.S. 868 (2009). 
 152. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954). 
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